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ABSTRACT 
Labour incomes depend on structural as well as politico-economic factors, 
because labour market policies partially remedy the financial market 
imperfections that make labour income shocks difficult to insure, and have 
different implications for labour and capital income. This paper illustrates such 
theoretical insights with a simple model, and reviews evidence of their empirical 
relevance generated by international economic, monetary, and financial 
integration. 
 
JEL: D33, J38. 
 
 
*
 This paper illustrates and reviews issues covered by the author’s keynote at the Money, Macro and 
Finance Research Group 47th Annual Conference (9 September 2015, Cardiff Business School). It 
benefits from comments received on that occasion. 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Policies that introduce rigidities in earning determination and labour allocation are often blamed 
for reducing employment and productivity. If policymakers are willing and able to implement 
them, however, those policies must trade those effects off others that are in their eyes beneficial. 
Lower employment and productivity may be a reasonable price to pay for smoothing the labour 
income shocks that cannot be insured by imperfect and incomplete financial markets. If it were 
possible to write and enforce fully contingent labour contracts, in fact, workers and employers 
could circumvent policy constraints by signing side contracts that effectively offset any legal 
provision (Lazear, 1990). Because financial markets are imperfect and incomplete, labour 
income is exposed to uninsurable shocks, side contracts meant to circumvent legislation are not 
enforceable, and policy can influence labour market outcomes in potentially beneficial ways. In 
an imperfect world, however, labour policies redistribute income and welfare across population 
groups that rely more or less strongly on labour incomes. Hence observed policies maximize, 
under structural constraints, politically controversial objectives. 
This paper illustrates the practical relevance of these general points for theoretical and 
empirical research. Section 2 introduces a stylized labour market policy in a very simple 
economy, and analyzes its effects for labour allocation and factor income distribution. Section 3 
extends the model to let a factor other than labour be in elastic supply, reducing the effectiveness 
and political desirability of the model’s labour policy. Section 4 discusses how this and related 
theoretical mechanisms make it possible for empirical work to exploit international economic 
integration as a source of quasi-experimental variation in the constraints facing national 
policymakers, and to establish the realism of a politico-economic perspective that, as briefly 
discussed in Section 5, may prove useful to policymakers as well as to further research. 
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2. Labour and finance 
Incomplete and asymmetric information generally makes it impossible to write and enforce 
labour contracts that distinguish the implications of exogenous shocks from those of 
unobservable individual behaviour. Policies that reduce the volatility of net labour incomes 
(hence the negative welfare impact of uninsurable shocks) also reduce labour reallocation and 
effort (hence equilibrium productivity). They can be welfare-improving, because laissez-faire 
markets need not optimize the trade-off between higher effort and consumption stability. But 
they need not benefit everybody, because their welfare implications differ across ex-ante 
heterogeneous individuals. 
To illustrate these points simply, consider an economy where each individual is endowed 
with a unit of labour that can be allocated to a default occupation with constant productivity , 
or to higher-paying jobs that require an unobservable effort or investment cost  and are subject 
to uninsurable shocks: each worker who has paid an income-equivalent amount  earns  + ε, 
where ε is a random shock with variance σ and zero mean.1  
Let individual objective functions be linear in the expectation and variance of income, with 
negative relative weight 	 on the latter. Then, workers are indifferent between the two 
employment opportunities when  − νσ −  = . Modelling individual workers’ choice 
between safe and risky jobs in terms of a mean-variance trade-off makes it possible to apply 
standard financial insights to human capital assets, which not only expose individuals to 
                                                           
1
 At the cost of slightly more complicated notation and derivations it is possible to let returns be 
decreasing and risky in both employment opportunities, as in Bertola (2014), and/or interpret the 
default occupation as untaxed leisure.  
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uninsurable risk but are also indivisible: each individual must allocate all labour to a specific job 
or occupation, so labour market risk cannot be shared holding diversified portfolios.2  
To outline the implications of labour policies, let all labour incomes be subject to a 
proportional tax at rate , the revenue of which is rebated equally to all workers. In this simple 
model economy, where all individuals have the same labour endowment, the redistribution 
scheme corresponds to progressive taxation and redistribution of their different labour incomes. 
It implications, however, are qualitative similar to those of the many real-life policies that 
smooth incomes and influence labour allocation, including unemployment insurance, 
employment protection legislation, and collective bargaining and legal constraints on wage 
volatility (Agell, 2002).  
In equilibrium, individuals should be indifferent between earning (1 − ) with certainty 
and paying  to earn the random income (1 − )( + ). As both the mean and variance of 
risky income are influenced by proportional taxation, the indifference condition (1 − ) −
(1 − )	 − = (1 − ) implies an expected wage differential 
 −  = (1 − )νσ  +
x
1 − 
≡ () 
(1) 
between risky and safe jobs.  
                                                           
2
 A mean-variance objective can be more rigorously micro-founded assuming normally 
distributed shocks and constant absolute risk aversion utility function (Bertola, 2014), which is 
also amenable to explicitly dynamic treatments (Shimer and Werning, 2008). More accurate 
analysis of redistribution’s welfare implications would take into account higher-order utility 
impacts (Chetty, 2006).  
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The tax-financed subsidy is not random if idiosyncratic shocks cancel out across workers, 
and when () labour units choose risky jobs it amounts to (()  + (1 − () )) =
(()  + ). Normalizing to unity the total number of labour units, and adding the subsidy 
to net wages,  
 + ()  ≡  ()   (2) 
is labour’s income-equivalent contribution to the typical individual’s welfare. As long as (1) 
holds with equality, all labour earns incomes that are in welfare terms equivalent to the riskless 
default option (2). In the  = 0 laissez faire equilibrium, (0) = , a constant independent of 
labour allocation in this simple model. This makes it particularly easy to discuss the implications 
of the policy represented by : while at  = 0 the returns to human capital investment are 
competed away in equilibrium,  > 0 not only smoothes out labour income shocks but also lets 
all labour units partake of the returns to human capital investment.  
Even though redistribution takes place only across labour incomes,  influences the 
economy’s aggregate output, because the average productivity and riskiness of labour incomes is 
endogenously determined by human capital investment choices. For condition (1) to pin down 
labour allocation, in fact,  should be a decreasing function of the number  of labour units 
allocated to high-return, high-risk employment opportunities, which therefore generate 
inframarginal income over and above payments to labour on the basis of its marginal 
productivity. To see this, it is simplest to work with the linear functional form  =  + α −
β, for α > 0 and β > 0, so that condition (1) identifies the relationship  
() = α − ()/β  (3) 
between high-productivity employment and the policy parameter .  
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Figure 1 shows, for the parameters listed above it, how  influences labour allocation and 
incomes. The marginal productivity schedule meets the vertical axis at α, and its -β slope reflects 
horizontal lines into vertical lines that meet the horizontal axis at the employment level (3). For 
each  the figure draws two horizontal lines. The higher one meets the vertical axis at (), and 
with the corresponding vertical line delimits a rectangle of area (α − ())()/β. A portion 
 of it, below the lower horizontal line, represents the excess over w of labour’s unit net income 
(2), which is 
() =  +
(α − ())()
β
 
 (4) 
in the linear-quadratic case. Production also includes the area 
(α − ())
2β
≡ #() 
 (5) 
of the triangles above each rectangle, which corresponds to rents accruing to owners of the fixed 
factors that account for decreasing returns in production. Like the labour income subsidy, this 
income is not random if the factors that produce it are traded in a financial market where 
idiosyncratic risk can be fully diversified. 
In Figure 1 the wage differential () declines as  grows from zero to 0.2, increases 
back to its laissez faire level as  reaches 0.4, and grows further for =0.6. To see why it is not 
monotonic, consider how the two additive terms of expression (1) depend on . The first, 
(1 − )νσ , is decreasing, because a larger  redistributes idiosyncratic shocks across lucky and 
unlucky workers, reduces labour income uncertainty, and lets a smaller expected wage 
differential support labour allocation to risky jobs. However, the subsidy is not contingent on the 
riskiness of employment, and human capital investment is not deductible from taxable income: 
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this is appropriate if individual labour market behaviour cannot be observed, and implies that the 
policy redistributes income from individuals who invest  and expose their income to random 
shocks, to those who just earn the default income. Lower private rewards to human capital 
investment explain why the second term /(1 − ) in (1) is an increasing function of .  
The first effect dominates the second for small  if νσ > , as in the figure. In reality, 
imperfections of labour and financial market make some policy interventions obviously 
beneficial. In this simple model, as long as νσ >  uninsurability of labour income 
unambiguously implies that at least some redistribution of labour incomes is warranted. For the 
same parameters as in Figure 1, the top panel of Figure 2 plots (4) and (5) along with their sum. 
All welfare expressions are increasing for small , because they assign positive weight to  and 
negative weight to the square of .  
Each hump-shaped expression begins to decline at points marked by a dot in the figure. 
The tax rate that maximizes rents is lower than the one that maximizes labour’s welfare. In 
Figure 1, in fact, rent triangles are maximized when  minimizes (): differentiating (5), this 
is the case when $ () = 0 and 
#∗ = 1 − &/(νσ). 
 (6) 
Incomes earned by factors other than labour are maximal when policy minimizes the wage 
differential, plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 2, and maximizes allocation of complementary 
labour to the decreasing-returns sector.  
The optimal  from this point of view is approximately 20% for the parameters used to plot 
the figures. It clearly does not maximize the welfare yield of a unit of labour, which by (2) 
depends not on total production, but on how much of the excess over  of labour’s productivity 
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is paid to labour. In Figure 1, the area of the rectangle that represents labour welfare at the 
minimum wage differential (#∗ ) is larger than at (0), but smaller than that implied by 
raising  further, to let more intense redistribution reduce the risk-equivalent component of a 
larger human capital investment cost. In the top panel of Figure 2, labour welfare grows beyond 
=20%, until it peaks at  about 38%.  
The maximum of () + #(), the economy’s total risk- and investment-adjusted 
income, is reached at a  value which is of course intermediate between that which 
maximizes () and that which maximizes #(). Maximization of aggregate income does not 
provide a very solid reference point for either normative or positive purposes if individuals 
income sources are heterogeneous and utility cannot be transferred across them by direct 
transfers, or by redefining factor property rights, but only through the distortive policies 
parameterized by .  
The model predicts that  should not be observed in regions where its variation would 
benefit all agents. For the parameters used in the figures, it should not be lower than 0.2 (else, 
increasing it would raise both labour and other incomes) or higher than 0.38 (else, it would be 
unambiguously beneficial to decrease it). Within those bounds, however, different  values are 
preferred by individuals who derive income from labour and other factors in different 
proportions, and the model’s positive predictions are not independent of the weight attached in 
political decisions to labour policy’s allocative and distributional implications.  
The policy targets labour income uninsurability, a financial market imperfection, using an 
instrument that has different collateral effects for individuals who own different amounts of 
diversifiable financial wealth, and are therefore more or less intensely affected by labour income 
risk. Figure 3 illustrates this simple insight plotting a weighted sum of labour and non-labour 
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income, () + '#(), for various values of '. This expression corresponds to aggregate or 
average income when ' = 1, to that of individuals who are entitled to different amounts of non-
labour income for other values of '. Welfare is an increasing function of the individual non-
human wealth index ', and is maximized by smaller values of  as ' increases from zero (a pure 
worker) towards infinity (an individual whose labour yields a negligible fraction of total 
income).  
Among Pareto-optimal policies, the one that is implemented is that preferred by politically 
decisive individuals. In reality, and in theoretical models where uninsurable labour income 
shocks are smoothed by self-insuring accumulation and decumulation of savings, wealth is more 
concentrated than labour incomes. The simple model introduced in this section implies that a 
larger  should be observed in societies where policy is chiefly determined by a majority of 
relatively poor workers, than in societies where wealth confers more political power to richer 
individuals.  
3. Policy and capital  
Consider next the implications for the policy-choice problem of allowing non-labour income to 
include not only rents (paid to exogenously given factors, such as land) but also payments to a 
factor (such as financial capital) that is competitively supplied. Continuing to work with linear 
and quadratic functional forms, let the expected value of labour’s productivity in jobs that 
require an investment and expose workers to uninsurable risk be 
 =  + α + δ) − β,  (7) 
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where ) denotes employment of capital in the risky-jobs sector of the economy, and a positive δ 
lets it be complementary to labour in production. If capital’s unit income is determined by a 
marginal productivity schedule with negative slope (normalized to unity), 
+ = δ − ),  (8) 
then subtracting payments to labour and capital from the total production corresponding to these 
marginal productivity schedules yields rents, 
# =
,

 + 

)
 − δ).  (9) 
If ) = ) is given, distinguishing rents from capital income only changes notation without 
altering the model’s implications. All insights from the above derivations and illustrations 
remain qualitatively valid when capital income and (9) replace the similarly quadratic expression 
(5) as the analytical counterpart of Figure 1’s triangles, and α + δ) replaces α so that, by the 
indifference condition (1),  
(; )) =
α + δ) − ()
β
. 
 (10) 
If instead ) adjusts endogenously to ensure that + = /, inserting ) =  δ − / in (7) and 
imposing (1) yields  
(; /) =
α − δ/ − ()
β − δ
. 
 (11) 
Expressions (10) and (11) differ in two respects: the constant term of labour’s marginal 
productivity schedule declines when ) is replaced by – /; and employment responds more 
strongly to () when δ > 0, because the marginal productivity of capital is kept constant by 
capital inflows or outflows that also shift the marginal product of complementary labour. This 
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illustrates simply the more general fact that, under very mild and plausible conditions, 
endogenous adjustment of other production factors increases the elasticity of labour demand. 
These expressions make it easy to characterize the welfare yield of labour units (4), which 
is 
(; )) =  +
(α + δ) − ())()
β
 
 (12) 
if the stock of capital is fixed at ) = ), and  
(; /) =  +
(α − δ/ − ())()
β − δ
 
 (13) 
if ) adjusts to keep the marginal product of capital fixed at /.  
Even in this simple model welfare depends in fairly intricate ways on the implications of 
capital endogeneity for capital use, for labour demand’s slope, and for policy determination. The 
model’s simple structure and functional forms however make it easy to characterize the policy 
implications that are of particular interest here. As discussed above, policy generally maximizes 
with respect to  some weighted combination of the labour welfare measure, in the form (10) or 
(11), and of rents and capital income, in (8) and (9).  
Because other factors benefit from employment of complementary labour, their income is  
maximal when  is as large as possible, i.e., when policy minimizes . As in (1), this depends 
only on human capital investment costs and labour income risk, and he right-hand panels of 
Figure 4 show that non-labour income is maximized by the  value in (6) regardless of whether 
) is fixed or adjusts endogenously. In top-left panel of Figure 4, conversely, endogeneity of 
capital does influence labour’s welfare-maximizing , which is intuitively lower when smaller 
rents may be captured for labour by taxation and redistribution of wage differentials. Formally, 
12 
 
both (10) and (11) depend on  only through the numerator of their second term, where elastic 
capital supply replaces ) with – /. Standard comparative static methods establish that an 
expression in the form  − ()() is maximized by a larger  if  is larger, as long as 
 − () > 0, which must be the case if  > 0, and $() > 0. If policy only maximized 
production and non-labour income, then it would set $() = 0.  If labour’s welfare has 
positive weight in the policymaker’s objective function, however, then $() > 0 at the 
optimum, and endogeneity of capital reduces the optimal . 
4. International economic integration 
In the model exemplified above, and in the related models briefly reviewed in what follows, the 
configuration and implications of labour policy depend on political and structural factors in 
arguably sensible and potentially observable ways.  
At given values of the model’s parameters, for example, larger values of  within the 
admissible region imply higher production and more volatile labour incomes, tracing a familiar 
trade-off between productivity and ex-post inequality. To assess the realism of such 
relationships, it is possible to exploit observable time-series and cross-country variation of 
policies, of their determinants, and of the outcomes they target. The simple model above, 
however, also shows that this is no easy task in practice. When aiming to characterize 
productivity-inequality trade-offs, for example, one should recognise that policy depends not 
only on political factors (summarized in the model by the weight of labour welfare in policy 
objectives, ' in Figure 3) but also on some of the same structural parameters that also influence 
productivity and inequality (such as the human capital investment cost, , and the intensity  
and welfare impact 	 of labour income risk).  
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Empirical work must identify plausibly exogenous sources of policy variation, and 
disentangle the exogenous from the policy-induced portion of outcome variation. It is of course 
simplest to view policy variation as exogenous, supposing that it is mostly driven by changes of 
political sentiment rather than by structural changes. This assumption may be empirically 
plausible in specifications that control for structural variation with country-specific features 
and/or fixed effects. A model that embeds a labour market similar to that discussed above in a 
dynamic consumption problem under constant absolute risk aversion predicts that labour market 
deregulation, represented by a decrease of  in the model and by combinations of policy 
indicators in the data, implies not only faster growth but also higher uncertainty, hence stronger 
savings motives and larger current account surpluses (Bertola and Lo Prete, 2015). Data 
spanning the period from the early 1990s until the 2008 crisis confirm that labour market 
deregulation was broadly associated with current account surpluses, and that the association was 
stronger when and where underdeveloped financial markets made it difficult to smooth the 
consumption and welfare implications of labour income volatility. Not only international trade 
deficits, but also policies and financial development are principle endogenous. Unfortunately, it 
is much easier to specify and characterize theoretical models where financial market 
imperfections, financial transaction volumes, and public consumption-smoothing policies all 
depend on deep parameters than to identify empirical counterparts for those structural factors. 
Interactions of global time effects with country-specific historical and geographical 
characteristics of each country, however, are potentially relevant and plausibly exogenous 
drivers of trade intensity, financial development, and government policies: this approach yields 
fairly strong and substantively interesting empirical results in a broad panel of countries (Bertola 
and Lo Prete, 2013).  
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International economic integration makes it possible for this research to detect empirically 
the motivation and effects of policies, because it alters in observable ways the trade-offs facing 
country-level policy-makers. In the model discussed in the previous section it is particularly easy 
to analyse the role in this respect of financial openness. The model’s country is financially 
autarkic when its available stock of capital determines ), and fully integrated in international 
markets when ) is endogenously set to ensure that δ − ) = /. The total income plotted in the 
bottom-left panel of Figure 4 rewards all its capital stock ) at rate /, and corresponds to national 
income when capital can be invested in (or borrowed from) other countries. Because capital 
flows exploit gains from trade, they cannot decrease national income in laissez faire.  Their 
effects are more complicated in the presence of distortionary policies. But only their interaction 
with policy influences welfare and incomes in Figure 4, because the parameters are such that the 
economy’s marginal return to capital would coincide with / at  = 0, so that in the absence of 
policy financial integration would be unconsequential.  
As in Figure 3, policy generally gives different weight to labour and other types of income. 
Should policy be chosen so as to maximize aggregate income in Figure 4, integration would 
leave it broadly unaffected, but result in a lower ; should it only target the labour welfare plotted 
in the top-left panel of Figure 4, then integration would result in a sharper decline, from a higher 
level, of the policy parameter . Such policy preferences are generally difficult to disentangle 
from structural heterogeneity, but the model’s functional form assumptions let integration 
influence policy choices in sharply different ways for labour and other incomes, and make it 
particularly straightforward to characterize the intuitive and empirically helpful role of capital in 
determining policy in laissez faire and the policy impact of financial integration. Figure 5 plots 
welfare before and after integration for the same parameter values used in previous pictures, and 
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three different values of the economy’s ). In autarky, larger values of ) are associated with 
higher labour and fixed-factor incomes, lower capital incomes, and higher optimal tax rates from 
the point of view of labour income earners: as discussed above, redistribution is more appealing 
when larger rents may be captured, and standard comparative static methods establish that 
labour’s optimal  is increasing in the intercept of linear labour demand schedules. The policy 
implemented in the model economy generally depends on the weight attached to labour incomes 
rather than to capital or fixed-factor income’s preferred , which is again independent of capital 
intensity. As long as policy does attach positive weight to labour income, however, higher capital 
endowments imply a sharper fall of  when capital mobility removes capital stocks as a source of 
policy heterogeneity.  
While the interaction of financial integration and policy is easy to characterise in theory, in 
practice the empirical implications of heterogeneous and gradual financial integration may be 
difficult to disentangle from those of country-specific structural or political trends. Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), however, provides an opportunity to observe cross-
country labour reform patterns in a setting where each country’s political preferences and 
structural parameters may plausibly be treated as constant over a period when, as evidenced by 
large international financial imbalances, the elasticity of capital supply in each country was 
suddenly and dramatically increased by adoption of a common currency. EMU changed the 
circumstances in which national policy is made, but arguably left unchanged its political motives 
and other country-specific factors, and labour policy data do offer significant support to the 
model’s politico-economic perspective on labour policies. Across EMU countries, the 
deregulation detected in early EMU by the European Commission’s LABREF data (Turrini et 
al., 2015) and by other indicators was much stronger in capital-abundant and capital-exporting 
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“core” countries, such as Germany, than in “peripheral” countries, such as Spain. The latter in 
fact experienced not only strong capital inflows and investment booms, but also some tightening 
of labour market regulation, which would be surprising from a simple race-to-the-bottom 
perspective but is qualitatively consistent with the implications of an explicit model of policy 
competition among countries of different capital intensity and size (Bertola 2016).3   
5. Concluding comments 
Much of this paper consists of straightforward derivations, intuitive illustrations, and simple 
formal results that do not need to be summarized, but illustrate practical implications of the 
simple idea that financial market imperfections and economic integration interact with political 
processes in determining labour policies. The resulting insights are positive rather than 
normative, but do have simple substantive implications for research and policy design.  
Accurate physics models not only help describe accurately the orbits of planets around 
stars, but also make it possible to design successful space-crafts. Similarly, politico-economic 
models of the motivation and implications of labour market policies not only help understand the 
                                                           
3
 The model in Bertola (2016), while closely related, differs from to that studied here in some 
key respects. Its constant-elasticity functions do not accommodate additive labour income 
uncertainty as easily as the linear functions analysed here and in Bertola (2014), but make it 
possible to characterize policy in terms of decisive individuals’ preferences. In autarky, these are 
a simple closed-form function of their endowments of capital and of labour, which in that model 
is supplied with less than infinite elasticity and earns the country-specific rents attributed here to 
owners of a generic country-specific fixed factor. 
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reforms triggered by economic integration, but also may help design policies that suitably shape 
and accompany international economic integration processes.  
To interpret and influence policy developments, economic research should aim to explain 
how and why reality deviates from the theoretical paradigm of perfect and complete financial 
markets. In an imperfect reality, markets and policies not only maximize production, but also 
resolve conflicting interests in its distribution, and the policy reforms triggered by new 
circumstances have both desirable and undesirable effects. Just as it would have been impossible 
to reach the moon ignoring the law of gravity, so it can be disastrous to disregard the need to 
address labour policy issues when liberalizing international financial markets.  
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Figure 1. Implications of labour policy for employment (on the horizontal axis) and incomes 
(areas of rectangles). 
  
20 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2. Implications of labour policy for labour and other incomes (top panel) and for wage 
differential between default and higher-productivity occupations (bottom panel). 
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Figure 3. Implications of labour policy for the welfare of individuals entitled to different 
amounts of non-labour income. 
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Figure 4. Implications of labour policy for labour welfare and other incomes when capital is 
fixed  (dashed line) or supplied elastically to keep its marginal productivity constant (solid line). 
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Figure 5. Implications of policy for labour welfare and other incomes when capital is available 
in various fixed amounts (dashed lines) or supplied elastically to keep its marginal productivity 
constant (solid line). 
 
 
